This means the ISP can still clearly see that connections are made to the Tor network. The connection between the user and the proxy is unencrypted and this applies to all proxies: http, https, socks4, socks4a and socks5. It is impossible to safely use a proxy to hide Tor. An example threat model includes a DPI device with limited time to make a classification choice - so the hiding is very specific to functionality and generally does not take into account endless data retention with retroactive policing. However, they do not claim to hide that you are using Tor in all cases but rather in very specific cases.
Some pluggable transports may seek to obfuscate traffic or to morph it. Using private and obfuscated bridges alone does not provide strong guarantees of hiding Tor use from the ISP. Īs for hiding Whonix ™ from network observers, this is a different subject which is covered on the Fingerprint page. The former version of this wiki page documenting some of the challenges in hiding Tor use from the ISP is still available here. The technical discussion which lead to this conclusion can be found here. However, reliably hiding the type of any traffic (such as voice over IP or Tor) from the ISP in a threat model that includes endless data retention with retroactive policing is an even harder problem which is solved nowhere. Anonymizing internet traffic is a hard problem that for example Tor and Whonix ™ are working on.
It has been concluded this goal is difficult beyond practicality. It is impossible to Hide Tor use from the internet service provider (ISP).
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